Five Questions That Will Determine the Fate of the Middle East: Will the U.S.-Iran War Erupt Again?

At the end of June 2026, four months after the outbreak of the war that began last February between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other, the regional landscape remains suspended between a fragile ceasefire and a faltering negotiating process. At the heart of this uncertainty, five unavoidable questions emerge:

 

Will a lasting peace be achieved between Tehran and Washington? What is Israel's position, given that it did not sign any agreement? Will the current fragile "freeze" continue? Is the region heading toward another full-scale war? And to what extent can Iran make concessions, and how far is Trump willing to go?

 

This analysis attempts to answer these questions collectively, based on the facts of the negotiating process and its economic and military dynamics.

 

Where Has the Crisis Reached?

 

The war erupted on February 28, 2026, with large-scale U.S.-Israeli strikes targeting Iran's military leadership and nuclear facilities. The campaign expanded to include the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was succeeded by his son, Mojtaba Khamenei, as the new Supreme Leader.

 

Following successive rounds of escalation and temporary ceasefires, U.S. President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian signed a 14-point Memorandum of Understanding on June 17, known as the "Islamabad Memorandum." It established a framework for de-escalation and paved the way for subsequent negotiations. Trump signed it during a dinner with the French president following the G7 Summit, while Pezeshkian signed it later in Tehran.

 

The memorandum is not a final agreement but rather a preliminary framework opening a sixty-day window for negotiations on unresolved issues, foremost among them Iran's nuclear program, enrichment levels, the fate of its stockpile of enriched uranium, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, partial sanctions relief, and the potential release of frozen assets worth up to $25 billion, contingent upon Iran's compliance with the memorandum's provisions.

 

The signing was followed by an expanded meeting at Lake Lucerne in Switzerland, with Pakistani and Qatari participation, during which the parties agreed on a roadmap toward a final agreement within sixty days and established a high-level committee along with specialized working groups on the nuclear issue, sanctions, and dispute-resolution mechanisms.

 

However, the ceasefire did not withstand the test of reality for long. Since the memorandum was signed, both sides have exchanged sporadic strikes around the Strait of Hormuz. Activation of the military "hotline" between Washington and Tehran, despite being agreed upon, was delayed. Iran continued insisting on prior coordination for the passage of vessels, while Washington maintained its insistence on complete freedom of navigation.

 

Following a weekend marked by reciprocal strikes—including the targeting of a vessel in the Strait and retaliatory Iranian projectile attacks on sites in the Kingdom of Bahrain and Kuwait—both sides announced a "cessation of operational activity" and agreed to hold new talks in Doha.

 

Meanwhile, the Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson clarified that the delegation traveling to Doha was concerned solely with monitoring the implementation of specific provisions of the memorandum (Articles 1, 4, 5, 10, and 11), stressing that negotiations on a final agreement could only begin after those provisions had been demonstrably implemented. He also denied any connection between his delegation's visit and that of U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner.

 

This divergence between the White House, which speaks of "high-level meetings," and Tehran, which insists on separating the track of "implementing the memorandum" from the track of "negotiating the final agreement," encapsulates the essence of the current impasse: a signed framework agreement without a fully agreed implementation mechanism, amid profound and mutual distrust. It is precisely from this deadlock that the following five questions arise.

 

First: Will Lasting Peace Be Achieved Between Iran and the United States?

 

The direct answer is: not in the near term, although it cannot be ruled out over the medium term if the current ceasefire endures and gradually evolves into permanent arrangements.

 

There are positive indicators that cannot be ignored. Iran has agreed to reopen its doors to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a move that U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance described as "a first step toward a permanent end to any Iranian military nuclear program." Specialized working groups have also been established to address nuclear issues, sanctions, and dispute-resolution mechanisms.

 

Washington has likewise announced the suspension of sanctions on Iranian oil for sixty days as an initial confidence-building measure.

 

Yet the nuclear file remains the central obstacle. While the American envoys are demanding the dismantling of Iran's three principal nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, along with the complete transfer of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile to the United States, Tehran—through President Pezeshkian himself—continues to insist on retaining its right to enrich uranium, expressing only partial willingness to transfer the stockpile to a third party.

 

At the same time, former adviser to the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Shamkhani described the demand for full U.S. control over Iran's nuclear program as "an illusion."

 

According to the Memorandum of Understanding itself, Iran commits only to refraining from developing a nuclear weapon and maintaining the current status quo temporarily, while negotiations over the ultimate fate of its nuclear program are postponed until after implementation of the other commitments has been verified.

 

In other words, lasting peace depends on resolving an issue that has remained unresolved for fifteen years: the nature of Iran's nuclear program. This comes at a time when domestic American political considerations—including pressure from the Republican Party's hardline faction, which compares the current agreement to the Obama nuclear deal—intersect with Iranian domestic concerns, namely the regime's fear that any nuclear concession would be interpreted as total surrender.

 

Second: What Is Israel's Position?

 

Here lies one of the most dangerous vulnerabilities in the entire process.

 

Israel is not a signatory to the Memorandum of Understanding between Washington and Tehran, nor did it participate in drafting it. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials have explicitly stated that Israel is not bound by it.

 

Amid debate over continuing Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Netanyahu affirmed that "the battle is not over" and that the Israeli military would remain in the "security zones" of southern Lebanon "for as long as necessary."

 

He also declared that Iran would never acquire a nuclear weapon "whether an agreement exists or not," adding that this commitment would remain unchanged for as long as he remained in office.

 

Israel's defense minister and the hardline ministers in his government also rejected including Lebanon within the U.S.-Iran memorandum, describing it as an unjustified American concession to Tehran.

 

Meanwhile, a U.S. intelligence assessment warned that Netanyahu might continue striking Hezbollah in Lebanon even if doing so jeopardized the entire memorandum, based on his own assessment of the threat and the need to further weaken the group.

 

In a notable statement, Netanyahu argued that Israel had created the conditions for the collapse of the Iranian regime.

 

Third: Will the Current "Freeze" Continue?

 

The most likely scenario in the foreseeable future—over the coming weeks—is the continuation of a wavering ceasefire rather than a stable freeze.

 

Since the memorandum was signed, the recurring pattern has been: limited escalation around Hormuz or Lebanon, followed by urgent diplomatic intervention through mediators to contain the situation, followed by a return to "technical negotiations" without resolving the core issues.

 

This sequence has repeated itself multiple times in just two weeks—from suspending talks after Israeli strikes in Lebanon, to resuming negotiations, then renewed confrontation around Hormuz, followed by another emergency meeting in Doha.

 

The factor favoring continuation of this fragile freeze, rather than complete collapse, is that both sides fear the cost of returning to full-scale war more than they fear prolonging uncertainty.

 

The U.S. administration fears the impact of an open war on energy prices and the global economy, while Tehran fears it may not survive a second military confrontation after suffering devastating losses during the first.

 

Fourth: Are We Heading Toward a Comprehensive Regional War?

 

The possibility exists and cannot be dismissed, but it is not the most likely scenario at present.

 

Several factors could ignite the situation:

 

First, the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and gas supplies pass, remains the scene of repeated incidents despite the agreed—but still inactive—military hotline and the announced understandings.

 

Second, the Lebanese front, where Israel's determination to continue striking Hezbollah intersects with Tehran's insistence that Lebanon remain part of any comprehensive settlement, making it the most likely spark for a broader regional conflict.

 

Third, the nuclear enrichment issue. Before the war, the IAEA warned that Iran had accumulated a record quantity of uranium enriched to near weapons-grade levels—approximately 440 kilograms enriched to 60 percent. Any indication of an actual "nuclear breakout" attempt could reignite the war from its very foundations.

 

Conversely, two major factors favor avoiding a comprehensive explosion.

 

The first is the enormous economic cost that renewed escalation would impose on global oil markets, at a time when prices are already affected by the ongoing conflict.

 

The second is the military exhaustion suffered by both sides, particularly Iran, which within twelve days of the initial confrontation lost most of its air-defense systems, missiles, missile-launch platforms, military leadership, principal nuclear facilities, and leading nuclear scientists.

 

Fifth: How Far Can Iran Concede—and How Much Is Trump Willing to Accept?

 

Iran's current ceiling for concessions includes accepting the return of IAEA inspectors, agreeing to a maritime coordination mechanism in the Strait of Hormuz, partially transferring part of its enriched uranium stockpile to a third party, and continuing to restrain escalation in Lebanon to the extent permitted by its relationship with Hezbollah.

 

However, the red line Tehran refuses to cross is abandoning its right to enrich uranium as a sovereign principle, dismantling its three major nuclear facilities in their entirety, or accepting any arrangement that could be interpreted domestically as surrender to Washington. Such a perception would directly threaten the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of its supporters, the hardline movement, and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

 

From Trump's perspective, the incentives for accepting a settlement are clear: achieving a politically marketable "peace achievement," while avoiding the costs of a regional war that could disrupt both the American and global economies ahead of important elections next November.

 

Trump himself has openly stated that he does not wish to bear responsibility for an "economic catastrophe" or repeat the historical experience of President Herbert Hoover.

 

At the same time, however, Trump faces domestic pressure from the hardline wing of his own party, which equates any flexibility on Iran's nuclear program with the Obama nuclear agreement that Trump has long criticized, in addition to direct Israeli pressure rejecting any agreement that allows Iran's nuclear program to survive, even partially.

 

The conclusion: There remains room for convergence on economic, maritime, and limited Lebanese issues, but almost no room for convergence on the core nuclear issue in its current form. This makes any "final agreement" within the next sixty days more likely to constitute another temporary extension than a comprehensive historic settlement.

 

The Economy: The Primary Driving Force

 

After examining the five questions, a deeper question remains: Why do both sides, despite repeated escalation, continue returning to the negotiating table instead of resolving the conflict militarily?

 

The answer lies in the economy, which appears to be the most effective force pushing the parties toward compromise, even more than military pressure.

 

Domestically, Iran is experiencing a severe cost-of-living crisis. According to widely circulated official data, annual inflation reached approximately 77 percent by May, after previously exceeding 65 percent earlier in the year. Prices of some goods rose by 100 percent in a single week, the rial collapsed to record lows against the U.S. dollar, and Iranian purchasing power deteriorated dramatically.

 

This reality prompted President Pezeshkian to announce the release of $6 billion out of $12 billion in Iranian assets frozen in Qatar, describing the move as "a major victory for the Iranian people," although neither Washington nor Doha has officially confirmed that any transfer has actually taken place.

 

Overall, Iran possesses approximately $37 billion in frozen assets worldwide, in addition to between $20 billion and $50 billion held in China.

 

However, economists warn that while these funds may temporarily ease liquidity and import pressures, they will not resolve the structural roots of the crisis without genuine fiscal and monetary reform. Indeed, part of these funds could become additional fuel for inflation rather than containing it.

 

Globally, oil prices have presented a striking paradox.

 

Despite the ongoing conflict and repeated exchanges around the Strait of Hormuz, Brent crude has remained at relatively moderate levels—around $72 per barrel—lower than before the outbreak of the war itself, driven by expectations that successful de-escalation could restore normal maritime traffic, potentially flooding markets with additional supply and lowering prices further, particularly for American consumers.

 

This economic reality largely explains Washington's determination to keep the negotiating channel open despite repeated setbacks on the battlefield: global economic stability has become directly dependent upon stability in the Strait of Hormuz.

 

The Most Likely Scenarios for the Next Phase

 

Based on the five questions above, three possible paths can be outlined for the evolution of the crisis.

 

Scenario One: The Most Likely

 

The continuation of an intermittent ceasefire, accompanied by repeated extensions of the sixty-day deadline and gradual, slow progress on less sensitive issues, such as the near-complete reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the gradual release of portions of frozen assets, and the partial return of IAEA inspectors.

 

All of this would occur while the core nuclear issue remains frozen without final resolution for months—or even years.

 

This path most closely reflects the negotiations thus far, which deliberately separate implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding from negotiations over a final agreement.

 

Scenario Two: Partial Collapse of Negotiations and a Return to Limited Attrition Warfare

 

This scenario involves recurring rounds of escalation around Hormuz and Lebanon at a higher intensity, with expanded Israeli strikes in Lebanon or Syria prompting limited Iranian retaliation, without escalating into a declared full-scale war, but resulting in the effective freezing of negotiations for prolonged periods.

 

This scenario aligns most closely with the actual pattern of events during the weeks following the signing of the memorandum.

 

Scenario Three: Comprehensive Regional Explosion

 

This is the least likely, though still plausible, scenario.

 

It would materialize if Iran took a step interpreted as an actual nuclear breakout, or if Israel independently launched a broad preemptive strike against what remains of Iran's nuclear infrastructure—particularly in light of Netanyahu's repeated statements that his commitment to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons remains unchanged regardless of any agreement.

 

In such a case, the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the simultaneous ignition of all fronts—Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq—would become almost inevitable.

 

Final Word

 

The U.S.-Iran crisis at the end of June 2026 is neither on the path toward an imminent final resolution nor on an inevitable path toward comprehensive regional war.

 

What truly governs the current landscape is crisis management rather than conflict resolution.

 

Each side has compelling reasons to avoid total collapse—Iran's exhausted economy and Trump's electoral and economic calculations—but none of the three principal actors, Washington, Tehran, or Tel Aviv, possesses either sufficient incentive or sufficient capacity to make the fundamental concessions required to bring to an end a dispute that has endured for more than two decades.

 

The most likely outcome under this fragile balance is therefore more postponed peace than lasting peace—or comprehensive war.