Issued by CEMO Center - Paris
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Abdelrahim Ali
Abdelrahim Ali

At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (35).. America and the Muslim Brotherhood (7)

Thursday 22/January/2026 - 07:02 PM
طباعة

The Testament of Mahdi Akef

 

We continue reading the report submitted by Mahdi Akef to the Guidance Bureau in Egypt after his return from the United States of America.

Here, we present the vision of the leadership of the organization in America regarding the issue of secrecy and openness, as stated in Mahdi Akef’s report.

 

Second: The Leadership’s Vision

 

Mahdi Akef continues to present the views of the Brotherhood’s leadership in America on the concept of secrecy and openness and the usefulness of each for the work. In a paper entitled “A Picture of the Situation in America as It Actually Is,” he states:

 

At present, the issue of openness and secrecy clearly dominates the concerns of the Brotherhood in America. This matter is no longer limited to responsible brothers or those at the initial organizational levels “family head and above,” but has become a topic of discussion across the entire base, and a question raised by everyone connected to the work, even if their connection is limited. There was no meeting in which I met the brothers without this issue being raised intensively and insistently, despite my attempts to downplay the matter, emphasize unity of ranks, and stress adherence to the ethics of discipline.

 

The general position of the majority of the Brotherhood, from the base up to the highest level, is rejection of the move toward openness, for which they provide several justifications:

 

a. The majority present in America are students, most of whom will return to their countries, and appearing as a member of the Brotherhood poses a risk to them.

 

b. Public declaration would not benefit the da‘wa in any way unless it is under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is rejected by those calling for openness.

 

c. Openness would lead to heightened alertness by local authorities in America, which could result in an adverse stance toward the organization.

 

d. The Brotherhood would lose its control over Islamic organizations that lead Islamic work in America, such as ISNA, the Arab Muslim Youth Association, the endowment, and others, since these institutions include all Muslims despite differing orientations. Distinguishing the Brotherhood through a new organization would stir ideological rivalries against the group.

 

e. As long as the new organization will not carry the name of the Brotherhood—as affirmed by advocates of openness—there is no need for it, since the Brotherhood’s grip on public Islamic institutions is strong, and effectiveness can be increased through these institutions without provocation or embarrassment.

 

It was natural for Akef, in his report, to survey the opinions of the branch leadership in America on this serious issue and include them in his report, which came as follows:

 

Brother Professor Hani Saqr, Chairman of the Organizational Shura Council in America.

 

Brother Professor Mousa Abu Marzouk, currently a member of the Political Bureau of Hamas and the general official of the organization in America.

 

Brother Professor Ahmed al-Qadi Jibri, responsible for education in the Brotherhood’s branch in America.

 

Brother Dr. Hussein Ibrahim, a member of the Shura Council.

 

Brother Suleiman al-Buheiri, one of the brothers known for sound judgment and widely consulted.

 

The orientations of all these figures differed on certain matters, while agreeing on others, as follows:

 

Brother Hani Saqr

 

He believes that openness would cause multiple problems, most of which align with the cautions mentioned above regarding public disclosure. He further believes that if openness is unavoidable, then in order to achieve distinction and root identity and loyalty, it is necessary to announce the Brotherhood’s name despite the risks involved, as previously stated.

 

His position is based on absolute distrust of the people of the Institute of Thought (by which he means the International Institute of Islamic Thought), whom he considers the origin of this new orientation. He believes that Dr. Ahmed al-Qadi is heavily influenced by them, adopts their views, and defends them. According to him, this creates severe embarrassment for the Brotherhood as a whole, as their foremost concern is the presence of Dr. al-Qadi among them as a leader and guide without his being connected to the Institute of Thought group.

 

He explains the Brotherhood’s general aversion to this new orientation by the prominent role played by this group in the proposed vision for working through it. This was further confirmed—and the sensitivity of the situation heightened—by the fact that the person who announced the vision advocating openness and undertook to explain it was Dr. Jamal Barzinji. Worse still, before announcing this vision, the man had circulated that it was an established reality with set timelines, implementation dates, and steps.

 

Brother Mousa Abu Marzouk

 

Abu Marzouk rejected the opinion advocating openness, attributing his rejection to the fact that the group proposing it largely belongs to the Institute of Thought. He believed that the view emanating from this group does not represent the opinion of the settled members of the Brotherhood, and that they were the ones who turned the call for settlement into the problem of secrecy versus openness, in order to leave the path open for themselves (a reference to the Institute of Thought group) to control the organization and direct it according to their vision and aspirations.

 

Brother Mousa added that the problem is embodied in fears of the Institute of Thought group infiltrating the leadership center. Suspicions about them are many, some even reaching the level of certainty. There are question marks regarding their relationship with Saudi Arabia and its intelligence services, and all their orientations fall outside the scope of the organization. They support every opponent of the Brotherhood, attend their conferences, and fund them heavily, while contributing nothing to the organization or its activities.

 

Moreover, they do not believe that the leadership of the organization in America has any right to command obedience or provide direction. They operate with complete independence in what they propose, presenting their orientations as special global ones unrelated to the da‘wa.

 

Hence the Brotherhood’s fears of them. Brother Mousa criticized Dr. al-Qadi’s escalation of the problem beyond the framework of America. He requested that, if there is an intention for responsible brothers to attend to help resolve the issue, this should occur during the convening of the Shura Council.

 

Openness for Only a Part of the Organization

 

Brother Dr. Ahmed al-Qadi—may God reward him—came specifically to New Jersey to discuss this matter. Over approximately four hours, the discussion of the problem proceeded as follows:

 

First: Dr. al-Qadi presented a history of Islamic work in America and the role of the Institute of Thought group in it, especially Dr. Jamal Barzinji, during his student years.

 

Second: He identified several points, the most important of which are:

 

The presentation of the project (openness) to the brothers was not honest, as it was presented as if the entire organization would become public, which was never proposed nor intended.

 

The presentation was based on the notion that it reflected the orientations and visions of the Institute of Thought group, and that I (Dr. al-Qadi) was acting on their behalf to present and defend it while they concealed themselves behind me. This, he says, diminishes his experience and loyalty, whereas the truth is that this is his view before it is theirs, and there is no fault in his view coinciding with that of others.

 

Dr. al-Qadi stated that he understands the Institute group deeply, in a way none of the agitated brothers have yet achieved, and that their experience and expertise are not as simplistic as the Brotherhood imagines.

 

Dr. al-Qadi believes that work on settling the da‘wa can only be effective if carried out by the settled members themselves, not by arrivals from the East. Therefore, he believes the work should be exclusive to them, as they are more aware of the environmental conditions and requirements, and more knowledgeable about life’s affairs and problems in America.

 

He also believes that the existing structures, as an organizational system of the Brotherhood, do not represent the organization correctly and therefore are unfit to issue sound decisions concerning the future of the da‘wa in this country. These structures are controlled by a majority coming from Eastern countries, regardless of anything else. Accordingly, in his view, the decisions of the organizational conference, the Shura Council, and others do not express reality nor keep pace with it. For this reason, he has refused to work as an official or as a member of the Shura Council as long as the situation remains as it is.

 

Dr. al-Qadi believes that the settled members should constitute the core organization, and that others should participate through the organization’s directives, orientations, and vision—just as any incoming group to a region in the East would do. No matter how numerous they are, even if they outnumber the region’s inhabitants, the region’s directives, vision, and systems remain the binding framework for their work. This, as he stated and emphasized, is his fundamental principle.

 

Nevertheless, he agreed to partially relinquish this principle to work through a local work section, on the condition that the existing organizational reality be changed so that the majority would not hold decision-making power through those it elects, often based on national relationships. Accordingly, he drafted bylaws for this section containing several provisions, the most important of which are:

 

a. Membership to be limited to documented settled members.

 

b. The section’s language to be English.

 

c. The section to enjoy full freedoms in all areas: decision-making, planning and programming, recruitment rules, work methods, and others.

 

d. All of this to be subject first to the approval of the office, then the Shura Council if necessary.

 

e. The section’s opinion to be decisive if the office holds a different view, with the matter referred to the Shura Council. If the Council sides with the section, its view is implemented; otherwise, the Shura Council and the office must relinquish their views, because the section is specialized in its field, and specialization is among the most beneficial factors in work and should not be constrained, “as he stated.”

 

Dr. Ahmed asserts that none of the brothers currently engaged in the work are fit to lead any public institution, especially ISNA and the NIT, and that only the settled members can competently do so. He states that he has many such individuals who can perform these tasks, and they are fully documented members at the same time.

 

Dr. Ahmed then mentioned that despite the effort he exerted in preparing these bylaws, he is certain they will be rejected by all Brotherhood formations, because they are ethnic formations before being da‘wa-oriented.

 

Dr. al-Qadi believes that a decision from the supreme leadership is necessary in this matter, as the base no longer respects the opinion of the local leadership here.

 

When I asked him: How do you guarantee the base’s commitment to implementing the supreme leadership’s order, given what you say?

 

He replied: I believe it will comply.

 

At this point, he was opposed by Dr. Hussein Ibrahim, Brother Suleiman al-Buheiri, and Sheikh Abdul-Muta‘al al-Jabri.

 

To be continued tomorrow, God willing.

 

Paris: five o’clock in the evening, Cairo time.


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