At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (51) ..Arab National Security (6–10)

Files Not Yet Closed…
How Did the Muslim Brotherhood Rebuild Themselves?

The most common mistake in reading what happened after 2013 is the belief that the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood from power, followed by its public organizational disintegration, meant the end of the danger.
In reality, what happened was exactly the opposite.

The Brotherhood did not disappear…
They changed their form.

The End of the Noisy Organization:

Between 2011 and 2013, the Brotherhood appeared in their most direct form:

• A clear hierarchical organization
• An openly declared political discourse
• Centralized leadership
• A loud presence in the streets and the media

But this model collapsed quickly, not only because it failed in governance, but because it:

• Clashed with the state
• Lost society
• Was exposed before local and international public opinion

From that moment, the more dangerous transformation began.

The Major Shift: From “Organization” to “Network”

After 2013, the Brotherhood entered a phase of repositioning, not by restoring the old organization, but by dismantling it into:

• Circles
• Fronts
• Platforms
• Specialized roles

There was no longer a visible “Guidance Office” managing the scene, but rather:
A flexible network,
With no center,
Difficult to strike with a single blow.

This transformation made confrontation far more complex, because the adversary no longer carried a clear banner.

The Human Rights Front: Politics in the Language of Law:

One of the most dangerous paths of this transformation was investment in the human rights file.
Not as a purely humanitarian cause, but as a political tool. We have seen this use even in the oldest democratic states, here in France.

The method was simple:

• Selecting incidents
• Exaggerating events
• Ignoring context
• Presenting the state as a perpetual executioner

Then exporting this narrative to:

• Western parliaments
• International organizations
• Major media outlets

Thus, the conflict shifted from confronting an extremist organization to:
A battle of narratives,
Managed inside air-conditioned halls,
Not in the streets.

The Economy: The New Battleground:

In the Brotherhood’s old experience, the economy was a marginal file.
After the fall, it became the heart of the battle.

The focus was on:

• Undermining confidence in the currency
• Distorting the investment climate
• Spreading doubts about stability
• Linking any internal crisis to state failure rather than global factors

The goal was not the immediate overthrow of the state, but:
To make recovery costly,
Rehabilitation slow,
And success permanently questionable.

New Media: From Channel to Platform:

After the closure of traditional channels, Brotherhood media did not stop; rather, it:

• Migrated
• Transformed
• Rebuilt itself digitally

Platforms, accounts, influencers, organized campaigns,
Operating with the logic of:

• Long-term persistence
• Short messages
• Emotional polarization

The message was no longer directed at everyone, but rather:
Each group had its own discourse,
And each crisis its ready-made narrative.

Why Does the Danger Still Exist in 2026?

Because the Brotherhood, in its new version, is no longer:

• A group seeking power directly
• Nor an organization seeking visibility

But rather:
A state of slow infiltration,
Operating within the cracks,
Waiting for the right moment.

The danger here lies not in their strength, but in:

• Exploiting crises
• Playing on contradictions
• Investing in fatigue and frustration

The Gulf Reads the Scene Early:

This transformation is what led some Gulf states, foremost among them Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, to decisively settle their position.

The debate was no longer about:

• Who is a Brotherhood member?

But rather:
What project does it represent?
And what kind of state can emerge under its shadow?

The answer was clear:

• A transnational project
• One that does not believe in the nation-state
• And uses religion as a cover and rights as a tool

From here, the confrontation was no longer purely security-based, but:

• Intellectual
• Economic
• Societal

The Lesson That Must Be Entrenched:

The real danger does not lie in an organization when it is loud,
But when it becomes quiet, concealed, and patient.

If the battle after 2013 succeeded in bringing down the organization,
Then the battle after 2020, and up to 2026, is:
The battle to prevent its reproduction,
Not to allow its return under different names.

From Hesitation to Decisiveness:

How Did Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Their Relationship with Political Islam?

The Saudi–Emirati stance toward political Islam was not fixed over time, nor was it formed in a single moment. It went through stages of:

• Review
• Testing
• And harsh correction

Between 2011 and 2026, it can be said that the Arab Gulf waged one of its most important intellectual and political battles—not against a specific organization, but against an entire model of governance and society.

Phase One: Miscalculation

In the aftermath of 2011, a general state of confusion prevailed in the region.
The picture was unclear:

• Were these genuine revolutions?
• Or managed chaos?
• And could political Islam be contained and integrated?

At that stage, regional and international actors wagered that:
Political Islam might be part of the solution,
Not part of the problem.

But events moved faster than analyses.

The Unforgettable Test:

What happened in Egypt, and later in Yemen and Libya, was a practical test of the containment theory.
The result was one:

• Confusion within state institutions
• The instrumentalization of religion in political conflict
• The erosion of national identity in favor of organizational loyalty

Here, doubt began to turn into conviction.

The UAE: An Early Decision… and a Calculated Cost

The UAE was among the first states to read the scene clearly.
It did not view political Islam as a conventional political rival, but as:
A transnational project,
Infiltrating state institutions,
And hollowing them out from within.

Accordingly, it took an early stance—neither easy nor cost-free:

• An open confrontation with the organization
• Investment in intellectual security
• Building an alternative state model:
  Development, openness, economy, and a clear national identity. What happened afterward is a story we will devote to another, independent series of upcoming episodes. Today, however, we are discussing the Brotherhood file within the framework of the Gulf equation after 2011.

This decision placed the UAE in the crosshairs of long-running smear campaigns, but it held firm because it had made its choice.

Saudi Arabia: From Review to Resolution:

In Saudi Arabia, the path was more complex, due to:

• Religious weight
• Regional role
• Intertwined files

But the accumulation of experience led to a decisive moment.

It became clear that:

• Political Islam does not accept partnership
• Does not recognize state borders
• And exploits any margin for its own expansion

With the rise of a new vision for the state and society, embodied by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, coexistence with a project that contradicts the essence of the modern state was no longer possible.

Thus, Saudi Arabia moved from:

• Managing contradiction
  To:
• Closing the file

Between Coordination and Difference:

In 2026, the Saudi–Emirati relationship appears:

• Not a complete convergence
• Nor an ideological alliance

But rather:
A strategic intersection around the idea of the state.

Tools may differ,
Economic priorities may diverge,
But what remains constant is:

• Rejection of political Islam
• Rejection of chaos
• Rejection of reproducing the crises of the past decade

This is what makes any superficial reading of the relationship between the two countries misleading.

Why Is the File No Longer Negotiable?

Because experience has proven that:

• Political Islam is not defeated by elections alone
• Nor contained by deals
• Nor does it transform into a genuine civil current

Rather, it reproduces itself whenever the opportunity arises.

In 2026, the question is no longer:
Should we confront political Islam?
But rather:
How do we prevent its return under new names?

From Security to Model:

The most important shift in the Gulf approach is the transition from:

• Security defense
  To:
• Building an attractive model

A model that tells society:

• The state is capable
• Development is possible
• National identity is not the opposite of religion

Here lies the fundamental difference between a state that fights chaos and a state that removes its justifications.

The Regional Lesson:

What Saudi Arabia and the UAE resolved was not a stance against a group,
But against an idea:
Using religion as a path to power,
And chaos as a means of change.

This resolution does not concern the Gulf alone,
But constitutes one of the pillars of Arab national security in its new form.

In the next episode, we return to the core:
To Egypt… why did it remain the constant target despite changing tools?
And how did the economy turn into an open front of confrontation?

To be continued,
Paris: five o’clock in the afternoon, Cairo time.