At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (65).. Islam and Freedom of Opinion and Expression (4)
The Human Being in the Qur’an: A Free
Creature… or a Determined One?
After pausing in the first and second articles at the
question of accusation and bad faith, and then at the problem of interpretation
when it turns into authority, we now arrive at the deeper root that cannot be
bypassed in any serious discussion of freedom of opinion and expression in
Islam:
How does the Qur’an view the human being?
Does it see him as a creature governed by determinism,
driven without will,
or as a free, responsible self, addressed through reason and held accountable
for choice?
This question is not merely philosophical;
it is foundational,
from which all issues of freedom branch out,
foremost among them freedom of opinion and expression.
Text and Interpretation… and the Human
Between Them
In the previous article, it became clear that the
religious text does not exercise authority by itself,
and that the flaw does not lie in the Qur’an,
but in an interpretation that was frozen,
then elevated beyond criticism,
then transformed into guardianship.
But the question that imposes itself here is:
How did this interpretation acquire all this power?
The answer begins with the image of the human being
promoted by some interpretations:
a person weak in will,
deprived of choice,
governed by a prior destiny,
possessing nothing but obedience and submission.
When the image of the human being is reduced in this way,
freedom becomes a danger,
questioning becomes a threat,
and differing opinion turns into a rebellion against what is “decreed.”
Vicegerency… The Origin of Freedom
Yet the Qur’an, in presenting the human being, takes a
completely different path.
In Qur’anic discourse, the human being is a vicegerent on earth — and
vicegerency here is not merely an honorific term, but a responsibility grounded
in will and the capacity to choose:
“And when your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed, I will
place upon the earth a vicegerent.’” (Al-Baqarah: 30)
Vicegerency has no meaning without freedom,
and responsibility has no meaning without the possibility of error.
If the human being were fully determined,
reward and punishment would be meaningless,
and the Qur’anic address to reason would have no justification:
“So whoever does an atom’s weight of good will see it,
and whoever does an atom’s weight of evil will see it.”
(Az-Zalzalah: 7–8)
Qur’anic Discourse: Invitation, Not Coercion
The Qur’an does not treat the human being as an object to
be manipulated, but as a subject to be addressed.
It asks,
engages in dialogue,
presents arguments,
and leaves space for choice:
“And say: The truth is from your Lord; so whoever wills —
let him believe, and whoever wills — let him disbelieve.” (Al-Kahf: 29)
Even in the greatest matters of belief,
the discourse is not based on compulsion,
but on clarification.
Faith, in its essence, is a free act:
it is not imposed,
not inherited,
and not extracted by force.
“Would you then compel people until they become
believers?”
(Yunus: 99)
Here, the stark contradiction appears between the text
and practices that have suffocated opinion in the name of “protecting
religion.”
The Old Debate: Determinism or Choice?
Islamic thought early on witnessed extensive debate about
human freedom — between those who advocated determinism and those who defended
free choice.
The discussion went so far that the Grand Imam Mahmoud
Shaltout, Sheikh of Al-Azhar in the 1960s (1958–1963), stated in his
influential book Islam: Creed and Law:
“We are commanded to attain our faith by ourselves. If we
do not reach the path to God, we are excused by the text of the noble verse:
‘God does not burden a soul beyond its capacity.’”
He added that the human capacity for attaining faith is
reason — a divine gift — and that if one fails to know God due to incapacity
rather than arrogance, one belongs to the saved group.
To this extent the debate over faith itself reached. Yet
when this debate approached political authority, it did not remain a purely
intellectual discussion; in many periods it became a political tool.
Determinism was convenient for authority:
it justified reality,
silenced objection,
and transformed injustice into “destiny.”
Affirming choice, by contrast, opened the door to
accountability,
placed responsibility for action on the human being,
and made objection a right rather than a crime:
“Indeed, God does not change the condition of a people
until they change what is within themselves.”
(Ar-Ra‘d: 11)
Here we understand why some promoted the image of the
determined human being, and why the Qur’anic vision that elevates human will
was marginalized.
From Doctrine to Reality
When the human being is understood through determinism,
freedom is reduced to a danger,
and differing opinion is seen as rebellion against the cosmic order.
But when understood through choice,
freedom becomes a condition of faith itself,
and difference becomes part of the laws of life:
“And if your Lord had willed, He could have made mankind
one community, but they will not cease to differ.”
(Hud: 118)
Thus, the relationship between religion and freedom is
determined not by the text itself, but by the interpretation we choose.
Why Was the Image of the Determined Human
Reproduced?
Because it serves:
• a political authority that does not want accountability,
• a religious discourse that cannot tolerate criticism,
• or an ideological movement that sees obedience as an end rather than a means.
Yet this image — however widespread historically — does
not express the spirit of the Qur’an nor its objectives:
“Did you think that We created you in vain and that to Us
you would not be returned?”
(Al-Mu’minun: 115)
The Human Being… The محور of Responsibility
In the Qur’an, the human being is not a blind follower
but an agent:
he errs,
he is correct,
he reflects,
and he bears the consequences of his choices:
“And We guided him to the two paths.”
(Al-Balad: 10)
From this perspective, freedom of opinion in Islam cannot
be defended without defending this vision of the human being.
Freedom of opinion is not an intellectual luxury or a
cultural privilege; it is a natural extension of the idea of the morally
responsible, rational human being.
Tomorrow, we will move closer to the text and pause at a
pivotal verse:
“There is no compulsion in religion.” (Al-Baqarah: 256)
And we will ask:
Is it merely a passing verse,
or a complete civilizational principle?
To be continued tomorrow…
Paris: 5:00 p.m. Cairo time.




