At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (42). .Dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood Organization… France’s Decision Marks the Beginning of a New European Phase (7)
Money, Endowments, and the Financing of Influence… When
Donations Turn into an Organizational Machine
If education shapes the “mind,” and social work shapes
the “environment,” then financing is what creates the capacity to endure.
Here, precisely, the report offers an exceptionally
important reading: the Muslim Brotherhood in France does not operate as a
fleeting proselytizing current, but as a financial system that knows very well
that influence is not built by sermons alone, but rather by those who possess
the ability to:
Purchase real estate
Build mosques
Establish schools
Finance associations
Manage human resources
Create media and organizational arms
For the organization, money is not an “auxiliary means,”
but a condition for existence, expansion, continuity, influence, penetration,
and domination.
1) Why is financing the greatest danger?
The report states clearly that the Brotherhood is the
most organized and influential Islamist movement in France, not only because of
its mobilization capacities, but because it possesses—compared with
others—material and intellectual resources that make it the most dangerous in
the long term.
The reason is simple:
Salafism spreads quickly, but it is often dispersed among
individuals and local islands.
The Brotherhood, by contrast, builds a network of
structures: schools, institutes, associations, conferences, imam training,
services… and these structures require regular budgets.
Here, financing becomes the “artery” that nourishes the
entire body.
2) The difficulty of assessment…
The report notes that estimating the Brotherhood’s
financial resources in France is difficult, because their funding structure is
based on:
The intermingling of associations and front organizations
Multiple sources of income
Local self-financing
External donations
A broad religious economy (halal food / Hajj and Umrah
seasons / conferences)
This opacity, as the report suggests, grants the
organization a massive advantage:
financial flexibility coupled with reduced capacity for
close monitoring.
3) The organization’s front and the gateway of money:
The report relies on a central example: the “Union of
Islamic Organizations of France,” which later adopted a new name, “Muslims of
France.”
It presents a telling figure from the testimony of a
former president of the organization:
the operating budget of the union’s central
administration was estimated at around 1.5 million euros, for 11 employees and
approximately one hundred volunteers.
There is then another large budget tied to the
organization’s flagship activity: the annual gathering in Le Bourget, whose
budget reaches about 3 million euros.
Added to this is the financing of mosques affiliated with
the network, schools, periodic conferences, mobilizations, and relationships.
Accordingly, the report estimates that the total
expenditures of the union alone approach 5 million euros annually.
These are not the figures of a small association… but the
figures of an institution of influence.
4) Self-financing…
The report draws attention to the fact that the
organization relies on stable internal financing based on several pillars:
Member contributions: the report notes that financing is
carried out through contributions ranging between 2.5% and 10% of a member’s
income.
Activity revenues: from events, subscriptions, and
various services.
The mosque economy: including seasonal and periodic
donations.
These pillars make the organization less dependent on
external funding alone, and more capable of resilience and expansion.
5) External support… when donations become policy:
The report mentions that a significant portion of funding
comes from Gulf states and organizations close to specific countries.
It estimates that the funding ratio may be approximately:
60% from self-generated revenues
40% from external donations
The danger here is not related to the money itself, but
to the meaning of the money:
external funds are not always “innocent donations”… but
are invariably a form of soft political investment in shaping political Islam
within France.
Every euro directed toward a school, institute, mosque,
or association produces a direct impact on identity, discourse, and belonging.
6) The endowment…
One of the most dangerous points highlighted by the
report is the Brotherhood’s establishment of an endowment entity: “Waqf
France.”
The idea reflects a high level of organizational
intelligence:
instead of constant reliance on fluctuating donations, an
endowment structure is created to receive funds, invest them, and then
distribute management profits to institutions serving the organization’s
project, foremost among them:
Schools
Religious training
Support institutions for the network
The report indicates expectations that the endowment’s
assets could reach around 11 million euros over 20 years.
This means we are not facing a preaching movement
operating on a day-to-day basis, but an institution planning for two or three
generations.
7) Bank Al-Taqwa…
The report goes further to an even more dangerous point,
linked to the international financing of Brotherhood networks, by discussing
Bank Al-Taqwa, founded in 1988, its activity in dozens of countries, and its
role in collecting funds and channeling them to networks linked to the
Brotherhood in Europe.
The report mentions prominent figures associated with
this financial track, and notes that Western investigations historically linked
the bank to suspicions of supporting the international Brotherhood network
worldwide.
The importance of this section lies not only in the
“story,” but in the lesson:
the organization in Europe operates within a cross-border
economy, even if under different guises.
The “Project” document… financing as part of a
penetration strategy:
The report recounts a striking incident involving the
discovery of a document within the context of investigations linked to Bank
Al-Taqwa, titled “The Project,” which presents the Brotherhood’s vision in
Europe regarding:
Penetration
Proselytization
Building influence
Political participation
Influencing civil society
Avoiding integration into values they regard as “infidel”
Here, the central idea becomes clear:
financing is not separate from politics… but part of a
single strategy.
9) Money creates institutions… and institutions create
generations
The most dangerous aspect of Brotherhood financing—as the
report shows—is that it is directly transformed into institutions with daily
impact:
Religious education schools
Institutes for imam training
Associations for women, youth, and students
Discursive and media platforms
Large-scale mass activities
Thus, money becomes a tool for establishing what can be
called:
an ideological infrastructure.
These are “cities within the city,” not merely buildings,
but networks of services, belonging, and mobilization.
10) Why does the money machine succeed?
The report implicitly presents three reasons for its
success:
Operating under a legal and civil cover that makes
funding appear normal.
Investing in childhood and youth to secure long-term
returns.
Linking religion, identity, and grievance to keep
donations flowing.
Here, financing does not function as a conventional
economy, but as an “economy of faith,” in which the donor gives because they
feel they are contributing to the defense of their identity and existence.
Finally, the report clarifies that the Brotherhood’s
penetration of France does not rely on propaganda alone, but on precise
financial engineering:
from donations to endowments, from mass gatherings to
schools, from self-financing to external support… to form a system capable of
enduring for many years and quietly reproducing itself.
When money becomes capable of creating institutions,
institutions become capable of creating a society within society…
Here lies the danger of the Muslim Brotherhood in France,
understood as a long-term project, not a passing wave.
The most significant revelation of the confidential
report, which has not yet been published, remains the intelligence component
related to the monitoring of a number of Brotherhood leaders by the Ministry of
the Interior and tax authorities due to their receipt of illicit funding. They
are:
Mr. Ammar Lasfar – President of Muslims of France
Mr. Mohsen Ngazou – Vice President in charge of reform
Mr. Okacha Ben Ahmed – Secretary General
Mr. Selim Koujil – Treasurer
Mr. Nasser Kahoul – Deputy Secretary General in charge of
activities
Mr. El-Hadj Tehami Briz – Member of the National Bureau
for Public Relations
Mr. Mourad Djebli – Member of the National Bureau in
charge of education
Ms. Hala El-Khamsi – Member of the National Bureau
responsible for introducing Islam
Mr. Mokhtar Sirikat – Member of the National Bureau in
charge of education
Ms. Kamelia Sarhan – Member of the National Bureau in
charge of the family
Mr. Karim Menhouj – Member of the National Bureau in
charge of social debates
Mr. Kotbi Abdelkebir – Missions Officer: delegations
Ms. Mariam Barkan – Missions Officer: religious
upbringing
Mr. Anas Saghrouni – Director of missions: youth
Bachir Boukhezr – Regional Delegate – Brittany–Pays de la
Loire
Sahnoun Kerrar – Regional Delegate – Occitanie
Jamal Zakri – Regional Delegate – Provence–Alpes–Côte
d’Azur
Marwan El-Bakhour – Regional Delegate –
Aquitaine–Limousin–Poitou-Charentes
Bashar Al-Saidi – Regional Delegate – Lower Normandy and
Upper Normandy
Anwar Alami – Regional Delegate – Burgundy and
Franche-Comté
Haitham Hazzaz – Regional Delegate – Auvergne and
Rhône-Alpes
El-Hadj Tehami Briz – Regional Delegate – Île-de-France
Tomorrow we continue:
Political action and the battle over representation… how
do the Brotherhood exploit democracy against the state? And how do they turn
civic participation into an “electoral bloc” serving the project?
Paris: five o’clock in the afternoon, Cairo time.





