Turkey's mobsters grow more confident as the state weakens

In Turkey, figures connected to the Turkish mafia are experiencing a feeling of confidence as expressed in their public appearances and remarks.
On Sunday, Turkish broadcaster Yol TV shared a video recorded over
TikTok of mafia leader Alattin Çakıcı enjoying a meal outdoors surrounded by a
suited entourage. After finishing his meal, Çakıcı exits, flanked by a convoy
of black cars.
This mafioso grandeur is not in
any way itself more than a display of pomp from a godfather of Turkish
organised crime, but the swagger of it embodies the confidence felt by mafia
figures today in Turkey.
Çakıcı, a mobster from the city of
Trabzon in northwestern Turkey, enjoys a layer of high level of support from
the political class for his exploits as a government hitman in the 1980s.
Arrested for ordering multiple contract killings, he was released last year as
part of a controversial prisoner amnesty bill signed by President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan.
He remained quiet after the
initial furor died down until Çakıcı issued a death threat against the main
opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.
Dr. Yektan Türkyılmaz, a research
fellow at the Forum for Transregional Studies in Berlin, Germany, suggested
that the mafia in Turkey is experiencing a growth in stature that predates
Cakici’s release and goes back to the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in
July 2016.
“In the post-coup environment, these mafia
figures began to become influential figures in politics,” said Turkyilmaz, who
described this rise as “unheard of” in Turkey.
Prior to the failed coup, the
mafia was routinely the target of law enforcement raids and investigations, but
they experienced something of a realignment closer to one another as the
Turkish state began to pursue a new set of internal enemies. This is not a new
trend in Turkish history; Çakıcı himself was reportedly employed by the
National Intelligence Organisation to kill members of the Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA).
The relationship between the government and the mafia was forced into the
limelight after the Susurluk scandal in 1997.
Erdoğan’s alliance with the
ultranationalist National Movement Party (MHP) also plays into the sense of
empowerment for Çakıcı and other powerful mafioso. The MHP leader, Devlet
Bahçeli, is a known ally of Çakıcı who lobbied heavily for his release and
considers him a hero for his service to the MIT.
Çakıcı’s own nationalist views
have been made known to the public before. Following the victory of the
People’s Alliance in the 2018 election, Çakıcı lambasted Erdoğan for not
crediting either the MHP or Bahçeli for contributing to their victory.
“You are not the owner of this
state! The cornerstone of the state is the ülkücü people… do you love Turkey as
much as Bahçeli?" he wrote in a Facebook post following Erdoğan’s victory
speech that night. Çakıcı then warned that Erdogan was “only a passenger, but
ülkücü people and Turkish nationalists are the hosts [of the nation].”
He is not the only
ultranationalist from organised crime who has become politically vocal. Sedat
Peker, another known mobster, has called for Turks to support Erdogan and
assailed the MHP in the past for critical statements against Erdogan. Known for
his pan-Turkic views, Peker has made a number of pronouncements about what he
believes the proper direction of the country should be.
Last October, Alaatin Çakıcı’s
photo appeared along with former police chief, politician and minister Mehmet
Ağar, retired colonel Korkut Eken and retired lieutenant general Engin Alan in
one of Turkey’s most famous touristic towns, Bodrum. The four figures who were
accused of some of the most horrific crimes of the 1990s, were confident enough
to be their picture taken in front of a Marina whose owner, Mubariz Mansimov,
recently jailed due to allegations of being a member of the Gulen Movement,
which the Erdoğan government blames for the 2016 failed coup attempt.
Mehmet Ağar is also known to be
close ally of the current Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu. Soylu, after the departure
of Erdoğan’s son-in-law and former Finance Minister Berat Albayrak, considered
to be the second most powerful Turkish cabinet minister who has aspirations for
the long haul as the future leader of Turkey.
Türkyilmaz explained that in the
interactions between the mafia and the state there is usually a power imbalance
in favour of the authorities. In Turkey’s case, the mafia’s sense is that in
some ways it is now a political power itself
“That relationship is changing in the sense that
the mafia has started presenting itself as a political power,” Türkyılmaz told
Ahval. “They have ideas of how the state should work, how good statesmanship
should be like and what the proper form of government is.”
He also adds that the weakening of
the power of state institutions may be contributing to the growing power of the
mafia in relation to it. In the two decades since the AKP came to power,
Turkey’s state bodies have become more subservient to political dictates rather
than act as apolitical entities. The increased polarisation of the Turkish
public from Erdoğan’s divisive leadership has also fed into a rhetoric of “us
vs them” at home. By aligning themselves firmly with the right-wing People’s
Alliance, the mafia is given at least some level of political legitimacy to
players like Bahceli and his MHP.
The AKP has appeared uncomfortable
at times with this situation. After Çakıcı threatened the CHP leader last year,
the party’s spokesperson only offered a gentle rebuke before going on to defend
Bahçeli’s right to maintain a personal relationship with the mobster.
This sense of impunity for a
mobster has chillingly been enforced by the state itself. In late November, it
was reported that a Turkish citizen in the Kuşadası district of Aydın on charges
of “inciting enmity and hatred’’ after he posted an insult against Bahçeli
online. Prior to his arrest, the citizen’s brother said the family was
threatened by members of the “Idealist Hearths” (Türk Ocakları) in Kuşadası for
speaking against Çakıcı.
To Turkyilmaz, the state is
“crumbling” from Turkey’s divisions that are empowering and legitimising the
position of organised crime.