Is Yemen the Next Frontier for the Turkey-Russia Conflict?

Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, photo via
Office of the President of Russia
Turkey and Russia are embroiled in separate proxy
conflicts on multiple fronts in Syria and Libya, but could be on a collision
course in the complex political landscape of Yemen. This can be avoided if
Turkey does not try for an aggressive Islamist takeover and respects Russia’s
desire to share gas profits, exercise political influence with whatever
factions end up dominating the sphere, and retain access to strategic
waterways.
In a recent video, Turkey-backed Syrian mercenaries
fighting on behalf of Tripoli’s internationally recognized Government of
National Accord (GNA) in Libya, aided by local Islamist militias, are seen
saying, “We are just getting started. The target is going to be Gaza.” They
further state that they want to take on President Sisi of Egypt and to go to
Yemen.
In an unexpected turn of events, the Libyan National
Army (LNA) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and supported by Egypt, the UAE,
Saudi Arabia, Russia, France, and, less overtly, Israel, suddenly fled Tripoli,
effectively returning the entire city and nearby areas to GNA control.
Within days, Egypt, at a press conference with
Haftar, called for a ceasefire and a peace initiative toward reintegrating
Libya—a call that went unanswered by the GNA. The day after the announcement,
Egypt was seeing moving trucks and heavy weaponry to the Egypt-Libya border in
an effort to show its willingness to take all measures to protects its national
security interests from being infringed upon by the GNA-Turkey-Qatar alliance,
which is backed by Italy and, symbolically, by the US.
Pro-LNA activists stated that Egypt would also be
raising its level of support for the LNA, though it is not yet clear what that
means. This development follows an unexplainable series of other defeats by
both the LNA and the Russian Wagner Group mercenaries.
In response to losing nine Pantsir missile defense systems,
the Russians escalated by bringing in jet planes. Turkey was also seen
importing heavy weaponry into the Turkish-influenced Idlib area in Syria as the
Russians resumed air strikes against Turkey-backed Syrian rebels.
Not only are the members of the Anti-Terrorism
Quartet fighting proxy wars against the Islamist bloc on multiple fronts in the
Middle East and Africa, but it appears that Russia and Turkey are likewise
squaring off in multiple countries simultaneously. While the outcomes in Syria
and Libya are not yet clear as Damascus finalizes the consolidation of
territorial control over the country, Russia has the advantage in Syria of
being allied with Assad’s forces and, despite their differences, Iran. It’s
anyone’s guess what would happen if Yemen were to follow the same trajectory.
And while Ankara has been asking for financial
support from various countries, it is too early to rule out the possibility
that it will invest financing it does not yet have in another conflict. Turkey
can likely rely on its funder Qatar’s willingness to fuel the fires wherever
possible and embroil its regional adversaries in endless asymmetrical and media
wars.
Indeed, there is evidence pointing to an aggressive
approach by Turkey to involvement in Yemen. Its activities are more in line
with Turkey’s previous soft-power approach to relationship management than with
the impulsive, scandalous, and bellicose activities that have backfired on Erdoğan
in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Libya.
In Yemen, Turkey’s presence is focused on the three
coastal areas. The strategic chokepoints
of Bab Al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden remain the coveted prizes that multiple
countries, including Iran and Russia, have an eye on.
Turkey has been trying to maneuver among the parties
involved in the multiple conflicts brewing in Yemen, and is possibly courting
the internationally recognized Hadi government for approval and support.
Yemen’s government is formally working with the Saudi-led Arab Coalition, which
would not look kindly upon such overtures.
The Hadi administration has been accused of
corruption and infiltration by Islamist elements. It has even worked with the
Muslim Brotherhood Islah party and military brigade, which has collaborated
with the Iran-backed Houthi separatists, causing friction and miscommunication
within the Arab Coalition. Erdoğan would almost
certainly be seeking to exploit any Islamist ties and sympathies, even working
alongside Qatar to entice such elements into joining the emerging Islamist
bloc.
Still, Turkey’s current maneuvers around Shabwa,
Socotra, and Mukha in Taiz are bound to raise eyebrows. Socotra in particular
is considered to be in the sphere of influence of the UAE, which adamantly
opposes Turkish interference in the region. Following Iran’s increased aggression
in the region and the oil tanker crisis in the summer of 2019, the UAE
decreased its military involvement in Yemen to the point that it was accused of
running away and abandoning Saudi Arabia—but it remains culturally and
financially influential in Socotra.
However, Qatari media and lobbies have mobilized
Islamist-leaning locals against UAE-backed separatists and others more
sympathetic to the goals of the Arab Coalition, and those are the elements to
which Turkey speaks. As it did in its approach to Africa and the Indian
subcontinent, Turkey has invested heavily in humanitarian outreach to its
potential Yemeni supporters via the Turkish Humanitarian Relief Organization
(IHH). The IHH has been active in the area (Shabwa) ever since—following the
withdrawal by the UAE of most of its forces—it fell largely under the control
of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2019. The idea is to spread Islamist control
through the Alam region in southwest Yemen, where Islamist tribes and militias
are increasingly pushing back against the Arab Coalition.
This pushback included a series of mortar attacks
aimed at food and medical supply lines that forced Coalition forces to retreat.
While the Coalition-backed forces appear to be increasingly splintered over
their differences regarding their long-term goals for the country, including a
recent episode in which Southern Separatist Movement forces claimed sole
control over Aden, causing controversy and havoc within the Coalition, the
Muslim Brotherhood seeks to exploit the ideological and physical vacuum of
power in the absence of a Coalition presence in Alam to push onward to the
strategically important Port of Balhaf. There, the Islamists would gain control
of the important gas exports (serving Turkey’s goal of decreasing energy dependence
on other countries). This would give them physical access to the coast
overlooking the Arabian Sea, which would be an important point of entry for any
future military involvement by Turkey.
While Erdoğan
is exploiting political tensions, he is known to be courting Socotra Governor
Ramzi Mahrous, who is reported to have met with Turkish and Qatari intelligence
in Istanbul.
Turkey is also using al-Islah to infiltrate the
educational system, religious institutions, and other social infrastructure in
Yemen, using Qatari textbooks and Turkish expertise in ideological influence to
radicalize the local population.
And what about Russia? For the past several years,
Moscow has trodden the ground in Yemen very carefully, playing all sides and
even providing formal humanitarian influence to retain access and open dialogue
with whoever ends up on top. Russia’s goal is more complex than Turkey’s in
that it is not seeking to openly declare itself on anyone’s side in the
conflict. As with Syria, Russia sees itself as a potentially influential power
broker among the many splintered actors. It seeks to be perceived as a
political mediator, though there is no sure path to becoming a kingmaker and
obtaining direct control or more broad and unifying influence (for the time
being).
While Moscow is not openly choosing sides between
Hadi/Coalition forces and the Houthis or even al-Islah, it remains in dialogue
with all parties without antagonizing any group through militant interference.
For Russia, the outcome in Yemen is less important than its ability to advance
its agenda by gaining access to potential military bases in the strategic
chokepoints, gaining political influence overall, managing gas exports, and
being able to leverage its role in Yemen toward a greater regional role and
involvement.
In theory, so long as Turkey respects these
boundaries and does not conflict with Russia over its interests, the two
countries can pursue their goals side by side, especially as there is no clear
winner right now. However, should Turkey advance more aggressively to impose
Islamist control and intervene militarily, and should it attempt to oust Russia
from a leading or influential role in Yemen due to a clash of interests or in
response to the non-resolution of tensions in Syria or Libya, another proxy
conflict could occur.
Will Russia join with the Hadi government and the
Arab Coalition or with the Houthis? That will depend on who Russia ultimately
sees as the likely winner.