Issued by CEMO Center - Paris
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Abdelrahim Ali
Abdelrahim Ali

At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (54).. Arab National Security (9)

Tuesday 10/February/2026 - 05:20 PM
طباعة

 

Files Not Yet Closed…

Strategic Misunderstanding… and the Rebuilding of Arab Power Balances:

When Regional Powers Were Misjudged… Between Underestimation and Exaggeration, the Compass Was Lost

If the error in assessing ideological organizations opened the doors to penetration from within,
then the misjudgment of the roles of regional powers opened the doors to reshaping the region from without.

The mistake here was not a single one,
but two contradictory errors committed simultaneously:
underestimating the danger posed by certain powers, and exaggerating the strength of others.
In both cases, a cool-headed reading of the equations of power and interest was absent.

Between the Real Threat and the Deferred Threat:

At moments of major transformation, regional power is not measured by its declared rhetoric, but by:
• its ability to expand,
• its instruments of penetration,
• and its strategic patience.

Yet part of the Arab mindset fell into the trap of situational reading,
treating some powers as temporary threats that could be contained,
and others as permanent threats with which coexistence was unavoidable.

Here, the equation became unbalanced.

When the Logic of Expansion Is Misunderstood:

Regional power does not move by emotion,
but by plan.
It does not enter conflict all at once,
but fragments it.
It does not seek a quick victory,
but a long war of attrition that gradually alters the balance of power.

In this context, the nature of Iran’s expansionist project was misread,
sometimes treated as a bargaining tool,
and at other times as a danger that could be postponed.

The result was that the expansion of influence always preceded reaction,
and that time management consistently favored the project rather than opposing it.

Exaggerating One Power… and Downplaying Another:

Conversely, the roles of other regional powers were at times inflated,
and they were treated as forces that could not be bypassed,
when in reality they were powers seeking a role larger than their actual size,
investing in the Arab vacuum more than imposing their presence through inherent strength.

The flaw here was not only in military assessment,
but in understanding the ceiling of political ambition and the limits of real capability.

It was the vacuum that produced influence,
not inherent superiority alone.

When Maneuvering Is Confused with Alliance:

One of the most dangerous manifestations of strategic misunderstanding
is the confusion between temporary political maneuvering
and long-term strategic alliance.

A tactical understanding may be a necessity,
but turning it into a permanent pillar,
without precise calculations,
transforms it from a flexible tool into a rigid constraint.

Here, some Arab states paid the price for a rapid transition
from managing disagreement
to betting on unstable balances.

Who Actually Manages the Region?

The question that was slow to be posed clearly is:
Who reordered the balances of power in the region?
The great powers?
Regional powers?
Or the Arab vacuum itself?

The answer closest to reality:
the Arab vacuum was the decisive factor.

When coordination was absent,
priorities diverged,
and disputes were transformed into separate policies,
the opportunity was created for powers such as Turkey, Israel, and others to expand their roles—each according to its own agenda,
each benefiting from the absence of a unified Arab position.
The lessons of Syria, Iraq, and Gaza are the best evidence—although the Syrian lesson is the most severe and the most costly.

The Missing Lesson:

Regional power is not confronted with slogans,
nor managed through reactions,
nor contained by wishful thinking.

It is confronted only by:
• a clear balance of power,
• carefully calculated alliances,
• and a shared Arab vision of threats that does not change with changing moments.

Without this, the region will continue to be managed from outside its own interests,
and its roles will be reshaped… without the participation of its people.

And if misunderstanding began from within,
deepened with organizations,
and worsened in reading regional powers,
then the next link points to a factor no less dangerous:

When the International Role Receded… and the Middle East Was Left to Crisis Management by Proxy:

The most dangerous shift in the regional scene was not the rise of specific powers,
nor the expansion of one state’s influence at the expense of another,
but the decline of international will to manage conflict directly,
leaving the region to face its fate through proxy conflicts,
fragile balances,
and deferred wars that never end.

This shift did not come suddenly,
but was the result of long accumulations,
beginning with the exhaustion of great powers,
deepening with changes in their priorities,
and ending with an undeclared decision:
let the region manage its crises itself… or bear their costs alone.

From Direct Intervention to Remote Management:

In earlier phases,
the great powers—foremost among them the United States—
intervened directly, militarily or politically,
and bore the cost of the decisions they made.

Today, however, the model has changed:
• no large, comprehensive wars,
• no long-term commitments,
• no desire to rebuild collapsed states.

The alternative was clear:
managing crises from a distance,
through:
• supporting local parties,
• managing balances instead of resolving them,
• and keeping conflicts at a level that neither explodes… nor is resolved.

Why Did the Great Powers Recede?

The reasons are multiple, but they converge at one point:
the Middle East is no longer an absolute priority.

Energy is no longer a pressure card as it once was,
major threats have shifted to Asia and Europe,
and the political cost of intervention has become higher than its returns.

Thus, what is required is no longer “resolving crises,”
but preventing them from spiraling completely out of control.

Who Pays the Price?

When the great powers step back,
conflict does not disappear,
but is redistributed.

Weak states become arenas,
middle powers become tools,
and major regional states become compelled players,
even if they are not fully prepared for this role.

In this vacuum,
regional powers emerged—Iran, Turkey, and Israel as stark examples.
Organizations multiplied—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and al-Qaeda in Syria as glaring examples.
Files intertwined—Sudan, Yemen, Gaza, Libya, and Syria as clear cases.
Every crisis became linked to another,
with no clear ceiling or time horizon.

Proxy Management… Who Benefits?

Proxy management does not produce stability,
but long-term attrition.

It:
• keeps conflict alive without resolution,
• exhausts states without collapsing them,
• and prevents the emergence of stable balances.

The real beneficiary is not the one who wins a battle,
but the one who prolongs the conflict,
keeping everyone in a permanent state of need for mediation,
support,
weapons,
and protection.

Where Was the Arab Position?

At a moment when the retreat of the international role should have pushed toward broader Arab coordination,
the opposite occurred.

Visions were divided,
readings diverged,
and each state turned to managing its crises individually,
or seeking shelter in partial external alliances
that produce neither collective security nor lasting balance.

Here,
the flaw was not the absence of international support,
but the absence of a shared Arab management of the vacuum.

The Lesson Not Yet Understood:

When the great powers retreat,
this does not mean the end of conflict,
but the transfer of its burden to local players.

Either this burden is managed through rational coordination,
or it turns into an open race of attrition,
won by the most patient parties,
not the most just.

Thus… if remote international management
has reshaped the region,
the most sensitive question remains:

Who benefited from the Arab vacuum?
And how did Israel invest in this scene to reposition itself?

This is what we will discuss in the next and final installment.

 


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