At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (54).. Arab National Security (9)
Files Not Yet Closed…
Strategic
Misunderstanding… and the Rebuilding of Arab Power Balances:
When Regional Powers
Were Misjudged… Between Underestimation and Exaggeration, the Compass Was Lost
If the error in assessing
ideological organizations opened the doors to penetration from within,
then the misjudgment of the roles of regional powers opened the doors to
reshaping the region from without.
The mistake here was not a single
one,
but two contradictory errors committed simultaneously:
underestimating the danger posed by certain powers, and exaggerating the
strength of others.
In both cases, a cool-headed reading of the equations of power and interest was
absent.
Between the Real
Threat and the Deferred Threat:
At moments of major
transformation, regional power is not measured by its declared rhetoric, but
by:
• its ability to expand,
• its instruments of penetration,
• and its strategic patience.
Yet part of the Arab mindset fell
into the trap of situational reading,
treating some powers as temporary threats that could be contained,
and others as permanent threats with which coexistence was unavoidable.
Here, the equation became
unbalanced.
When the Logic of
Expansion Is Misunderstood:
Regional power does not move by
emotion,
but by plan.
It does not enter conflict all at once,
but fragments it.
It does not seek a quick victory,
but a long war of attrition that gradually alters the balance of power.
In this context, the nature of
Iran’s expansionist project was misread,
sometimes treated as a bargaining tool,
and at other times as a danger that could be postponed.
The result was that the expansion
of influence always preceded reaction,
and that time management consistently favored the project rather than opposing
it.
Exaggerating One
Power… and Downplaying Another:
Conversely, the roles of other
regional powers were at times inflated,
and they were treated as forces that could not be bypassed,
when in reality they were powers seeking a role larger than their actual size,
investing in the Arab vacuum more than imposing their presence through inherent
strength.
The flaw here was not only in
military assessment,
but in understanding the ceiling of political ambition and the limits of real
capability.
It was the vacuum that produced
influence,
not inherent superiority alone.
When Maneuvering Is
Confused with Alliance:
One of the most dangerous
manifestations of strategic misunderstanding
is the confusion between temporary political maneuvering
and long-term strategic alliance.
A tactical understanding may be a
necessity,
but turning it into a permanent pillar,
without precise calculations,
transforms it from a flexible tool into a rigid constraint.
Here, some Arab states paid the
price for a rapid transition
from managing disagreement
to betting on unstable balances.
Who Actually Manages
the Region?
The question that was slow to be
posed clearly is:
Who reordered the balances of power in the region?
The great powers?
Regional powers?
Or the Arab vacuum itself?
The answer closest to reality:
the Arab vacuum was the decisive factor.
When coordination was absent,
priorities diverged,
and disputes were transformed into separate policies,
the opportunity was created for powers such as Turkey, Israel, and others to
expand their roles—each according to its own agenda,
each benefiting from the absence of a unified Arab position.
The lessons of Syria, Iraq, and Gaza are the best evidence—although the Syrian
lesson is the most severe and the most costly.
The Missing Lesson:
Regional power is not confronted
with slogans,
nor managed through reactions,
nor contained by wishful thinking.
It is confronted only by:
• a clear balance of power,
• carefully calculated alliances,
• and a shared Arab vision of threats that does not change with changing
moments.
Without this, the region will
continue to be managed from outside its own interests,
and its roles will be reshaped… without the participation of its people.
And if misunderstanding began
from within,
deepened with organizations,
and worsened in reading regional powers,
then the next link points to a factor no less dangerous:
When the
International Role Receded… and the Middle East Was Left to Crisis Management
by Proxy:
The most dangerous shift in the
regional scene was not the rise of specific powers,
nor the expansion of one state’s influence at the expense of another,
but the decline of international will to manage conflict directly,
leaving the region to face its fate through proxy conflicts,
fragile balances,
and deferred wars that never end.
This shift did not come suddenly,
but was the result of long accumulations,
beginning with the exhaustion of great powers,
deepening with changes in their priorities,
and ending with an undeclared decision:
let the region manage its crises itself… or bear their costs alone.
From Direct
Intervention to Remote Management:
In earlier phases,
the great powers—foremost among them the United States—
intervened directly, militarily or politically,
and bore the cost of the decisions they made.
Today, however, the model has
changed:
• no large, comprehensive wars,
• no long-term commitments,
• no desire to rebuild collapsed states.
The alternative was clear:
managing crises from a distance,
through:
• supporting local parties,
• managing balances instead of resolving them,
• and keeping conflicts at a level that neither explodes… nor is resolved.
Why Did the Great
Powers Recede?
The reasons are multiple, but
they converge at one point:
the Middle East is no longer an absolute priority.
Energy is no longer a pressure
card as it once was,
major threats have shifted to Asia and Europe,
and the political cost of intervention has become higher than its returns.
Thus, what is required is no
longer “resolving crises,”
but preventing them from spiraling completely out of control.
Who Pays the Price?
When the great powers step back,
conflict does not disappear,
but is redistributed.
Weak states become arenas,
middle powers become tools,
and major regional states become compelled players,
even if they are not fully prepared for this role.
In this vacuum,
regional powers emerged—Iran, Turkey, and Israel as stark examples.
Organizations multiplied—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, the Popular
Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and al-Qaeda in Syria as glaring examples.
Files intertwined—Sudan, Yemen, Gaza, Libya, and Syria as clear cases.
Every crisis became linked to another,
with no clear ceiling or time horizon.
Proxy Management… Who
Benefits?
Proxy management does not produce
stability,
but long-term attrition.
It:
• keeps conflict alive without resolution,
• exhausts states without collapsing them,
• and prevents the emergence of stable balances.
The real beneficiary is not the
one who wins a battle,
but the one who prolongs the conflict,
keeping everyone in a permanent state of need for mediation,
support,
weapons,
and protection.
Where Was the Arab
Position?
At a moment when the retreat of
the international role should have pushed toward broader Arab coordination,
the opposite occurred.
Visions were divided,
readings diverged,
and each state turned to managing its crises individually,
or seeking shelter in partial external alliances
that produce neither collective security nor lasting balance.
Here,
the flaw was not the absence of international support,
but the absence of a shared Arab management of the vacuum.
The Lesson Not Yet
Understood:
When the great powers retreat,
this does not mean the end of conflict,
but the transfer of its burden to local players.
Either this burden is managed
through rational coordination,
or it turns into an open race of attrition,
won by the most patient parties,
not the most just.
Thus… if remote international
management
has reshaped the region,
the most sensitive question remains:
Who benefited from the Arab
vacuum?
And how did Israel invest in this scene to reposition itself?
This is what we will discuss in
the next and final installment.





