At five in the afternoon, Cairo time (43).. Dismantling the Muslim Brotherhood Organization: France’s Decision and the Beginning of a New European Phase (8)

From “civic participation” to engineering influence… when democracy becomes a tool of penetration:

 

The most dangerous thing the Muslim Brotherhood does in France is not that it builds a mosque or runs an association. Rather, the real danger lies in its success—gradually—in presenting itself as the sole and legitimate representative of Muslims in France.

 

Here, the organization shifts from the role of a “current within society” to that of a “gateway to society”: anyone who wishes to deal with Muslims must pass through it; anyone who wants to defend Muslims must adopt its language; anyone seeking their votes must negotiate with it. Herein lies the true danger—that the organization may, over time, turn into a pressure card in shaping the domestic and foreign policy of a country the size of France.

 

In this sense, the security battle alone is not the foundation. The real battle becomes:

Who represents Muslims? Who speaks in their name? And who has the right to define Islam itself as a religion?

 

This is what the report calls: the war of representation.

 

1) The war of representation: the primary objective above all else

 

The report argues that the Brotherhood built its penetration in France on the basis of a “war of terminology” and a “war of legitimacy.” Any political force does not need massive numerical spread to prevail; it is sufficient to seize the following:

 

The right to speak on behalf of the group

 

The right to define the problem

 

The right to determine who is the victim and who is the perpetrator

 

The right to set the boundaries of public debate

 

Accordingly, their core battle becomes:

How the Brotherhood transforms from an organization into a “reference,” and from a reference into the “sole official representative.”

 

2) Brotherhood intelligence: appearing as a victim and exploiting republican values

 

The report explains that the Brotherhood relies on a dual strategy:

 

Within the Muslim community: portraying conservative society as a perpetually targeted victim.

 

Outside the community: dismantling any criticism through a rights-based, republican, anti-racism discourse—in other words, they simply employ the method of “taqiyya.”

 

That is, the organization dons the language of the state itself and uses “the values of the Republic” as a defensive shield against the state.

 

The result—as the report describes—is that public opinion becomes confused between:

 

Combating the Brotherhood as a fundamentalist organization

 

And racism against Muslims

 

Thus, those who confront Brotherhood extremism are turned into “accused parties,” while those who build that extremism are transformed into “victims.”

 

3) “Islamophobia”: the most effective political weapon

 

The report considers the term “Islamophobia” to be a central element in this war, because it enables a dangerous mechanism:

 

Neutralizing criticism

 

Demonizing dissenters

 

Blocking debate

 

Portraying the state as a repressive actor

 

And presenting the organization as a defender of rights

 

Strangely enough, is this not literally what they followed in Egypt for decades until they were exposed during the year in which Mohamed Morsi al-Ayyat ruled, under the guidance of the group’s Supreme Guide?

 

The problem is not confronting genuine discrimination, but rather exploiting the term as political scissors that cut off any accountability of the Brotherhood organization.

 

Thus, the battle shifts from a discussion about extremism to a battle over “public morality” and “discrimination”—an ideal environment for the Brotherhood.

 

4) Front organizations: keys to entry into the political arena

 

The report points out that the Brotherhood does not always operate under the name “the Brotherhood,” but rather through networks and organizations bearing names that appear civil, rights-based, or anti-racist.

 

The report provides clear examples of organizations that played the role of gateways to influence, such as:

 

The Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF)

 

The Party of the Indigenous of the Republic

 

These organizations—according to the report—are not merely associations, but “platforms” for transferring the Brotherhood’s discourse from closed circles to open space, then to political parties, and then to the media.

 

In this way, the organization becomes present in politics without raising its own banner.

 

5) Manufacturing an electoral bloc: the “citizen” as an organizational project

 

The report reaches one of its most dangerous conclusions:

The Brotherhood does not view the “Muslim citizen” as an individual citizen within the French Republic, but rather as part of a bloc that must be mobilized, directed, and exploited.

 

Here, voting ceases to be an individual practice and becomes collective discipline.

 

The report cites the example of the preacher Hassan Iquioussen, who presents participation in politics as:

 

A societal necessity

 

And also a religious necessity

 

The report mentions an extremely dangerous notion:

That abstaining from voting is presented as “political and social suicide… and even religious suicide.”

 

Thus, elections are transformed from a space of freedom into a tool of mobilization.

 

6) Soft penetration of institutions: the school as a model

 

The report affirms that the organization does not limit itself to shaping public opinion, but also pushes its followers to infiltrate state and societal institutions through seemingly natural paths, such as:

 

Joining parents’ associations

 

Participating in school administration

 

Presence in the student sphere

 

Union alliances within universities

 

These are not “details,” but links in a single chain:

The formation of local influence that begins at school, expands to the university, and then extends to the labor market and politics.

 

7) Dual discourse: the civil face and the mobilizational face

 

The report explains that the Brotherhood masters the technique of “dual discourse”:

 

An external discourse that is rational, civil, and soft

 

An internal discourse that is mobilizational, identity-based, grounded in grievance and alignment

 

The result is that the organization wins on both fronts:

 

It gains the sympathy of institutions, rights advocates, and the media

 

While simultaneously maintaining internal mobilization that grants it control

 

Herein lies its danger:

It appears “open” to the state and “combative” to its audience.

 

8) The goal of political warfare: paralyzing criticism and intimidating opponents

 

The report argues that expanding political influence is not achieved solely through elections, but also through:

 

Silencing dissenters

 

Intimidating critics

 

Smearing opponents

 

Applying pressure through rights-based and media platforms

 

Thus, “democratic legitimacy” is transformed into a platform for closing democracy itself.

 

This places the state in a complex position:

If it responds forcefully, it is accused of racism; if it retreats, the organization expands further.

 

9) Turning secularism into a battleground rather than a unifying framework

 

The report places secularism at the heart of the political conflict, because the Brotherhood seeks to portray it as:

 

An enemy of religion

 

And a tool of repression against Muslims

 

Whereas the essence of secularism in France is the neutrality of the state, its equal distance from all religions, and the protection of the public sphere from religious domination.

 

But the Brotherhood—as the report explains—pushes toward “selective secularism,” namely:

 

Accepting Islamic symbols as an absolute right

 

While simultaneously dismantling the authority of secularism as a unifying value

 

The result is not religious freedom, but the creation of a field that constantly drains the state and grants the organization a permanent opportunity for expansion.

 

Conclusion

 

What the report outlines is not merely direct political intervention, but a gradual construction that begins with:

 

Terminology

 

Then associations

 

Then media

 

Then institutions

 

Then elections

 

Then representation

 

Thus, France—according to the authors of the report—becomes an arena for a long-term struggle for influence, in which the Brotherhood’s political activity is not a separate goal, but the final stage of accumulated education, social work, and financing.

 

The Brotherhood in France does not confront the state with weapons; it confronts it through representation, terminology, legitimacy, and soft pressure within democracy itself.

 

They transform the values of the French Republic into defensive tools for a project that contradicts those values and undermines the pillars of the Republic, and they turn civic participation into an organized electoral bloc, then into the ability to impose their conditions on public debate.

 

Tomorrow we continue:

From the classroom to the ballot box… how does the Brotherhood network produce a “new French citizen” partially detached from society?

 

Paris: five o’clock in the evening, Cairo time.