of the group after the revolution was much like soul-searching. It was mostly
addressed to the junior members of the group, the government and those closely
following alterations in the conduct of the Islamic Group. This discourse aimed
at giving assurances to everybody that the group was changing, in its bid to
gain more presence on the new political stage.
The absence of
a detailed political program was one of the toughest challenges facing the
Islamic Group after the revolution, even as it was confident that it would not
be allowed to operate freely.
This was the
real danger that led to the setback of quite a few, the perception that these
reviews and opinions reflect the betrayal of the leader or sincerity, and was
not considered to be developed by the traditional accounts of the leader's
thought and evidence of maturity. This reflected the failure of the group after
the revolution. This was evident in the conflict that erupted between the
leaders of the first row, and the dismissal of Safwat Abdel Ghani, and the
suspension of Essam Derbala.
It was found
that the surface was different from what lied underneath. There was a struggle
over the details of the revision initiative, although everyone acknowledged the
need for suspending violence. Everybody also believed that the struggle for
these applications was being led by a large team led by Tariq al-Zumar,
together with Salah Hashim, the group's main founder.
It was clear
that the leaders of the group were demonstrating unity and that there was no
one among them who thought differently.
differences emerged in the hall of the prison hospital. Ali al-Sharif and Essam
Derbala, and some leaders of the second row in the group were at the center of
these differences. Some decisions were
taken during the seminars that were held to correct concepts.
Deviating from the reform track
From the beginning of its inception to the post-revolutionary period, the Islamic Group suffered no division. This situation was one of the greatest historical events. The decision to suspend Derbala and separate Abdel Ghani was rejected by al-Zumur and many other members of the group. These people held a general assembly to elect new leaders, although this meant that individuals were registered in a formal manner in a certain number according to the basic law of the organization.
This did not happen because the group had no legitimacy at any time. Have a basic law, and have no registered members in a real way; so what was subsequently a coup against the generosity of Zohidi and Ibrahim succeeded, in a new way they understood together. They resigned from all administrative positions.
The group split immediately after the revolution. The Cairo group was led by Sameh al-Shahat, Mohammed Ibrahim, Sheikh Adly and Mohammed Bakri. This group sought to form a special Islamic association, and still stands on the middle line between all directions, declaring its full support for the Brotherhood.
Sheikh Adly was closer to the perceptions of Derbala and Abdel Maged.
The Alexandria, Mansoura, Damietta and Menia groups took sides with Zohdi and Ibrahim. The Sohag and Assiut groups were led by Abdel Hakim Hammad and Salah Hashim. They took a position in the middle among all other groups.
It was clear that the group is divided by two approaches. The first was the fundamental reformist change in the rules of society, and the other the superpower that wanted to reach power for change. The latter was victorious in the end and announced the victory of Derbala.
In this period, the Egyptian revolution changed everything. The Islamic Group pushed to take quick and hasty positions. These included returning to its old mosques, which were endowed by the Waqfs, the alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood and coordination with the Salafist al-Nour Party.
Researcher Hisham al-Nagar said the Islamic Group had completely sided with the Brotherhood when it came to power.
"When it moved away from the Brotherhood, the Islamic Group engaged in violence and confrontation with the new authority," al-Nagar said.
He added that the Islamic Group stood with the Muslim Brotherhood in the face of the state and supported its options.
The Brotherhood's was involved in clear violence, he said, and formed armed secret groups, despite the near-intellectual reviews it conducted and the initiative to stop the violence it launched in the late Mubarak era.
The Islamic Group's decision to stop the violence in the 1990s was not based on comprehensive reviews and strategic and permanent strategic visions. This was in a large part a tactical, temporary and breathtaking position to regain strength and rebuild the organization.
The group had a permanent strategic methodology for dealing with the state and the nature of its societal role, whatever the circumstances.
The reformers came out of the group, and the hawks took control of the whole organization. For the first time, we saw the difference between the two groups. While Zohdi and his colleagues criticized the assassination of the late president Anwar Sadat, second row leaders took pride in this assassination.
The leaders of the current Islamic Group believed that they were badly in need of Muslim Brotherhood support. The same leaders embraced the approach of change upheaval, claiming that what came to be known as the "Islamic project" would be achieved only by the arrival of the Islamic movement to power.
After the hawks took control of the group and its party, the discourse of the group became lethal and vengeful. In the 1990s, this became a phenomenon that included all the governorates of Egypt. Most of the elements put the pictures of the dead, and they were proud of them. They made long stories, sometimes strange ones, about their deaths.
Group media spokesman, Mohamed Hassan al-Sawy called for patience with God.
"How do you compare the martyrs of the group who were killed in the way of Allah with those who violated divine rules?" he asked.
It was clear from al-Sawy's statements that the crisis of the group was not one of the leaders, but of the grassroots. The leaders were from the youth generation, and their decisions were not studied, including the assassination of Sadat and the events of Assiut.
The reason for this is the absence of centers of strategic studies within the group, as well as the ignorance of individuals about political science, and the lack of proficiency of inside group in dealing with the media at all caused many problems.
There was a vision before the initiative. This vision called for public advocacy and secret action with the aim of changing society from the bottom up.
After the January 25 revolution and the resignation of Zohdi and Ibrahim, the group had two visions: the old one and the modern one. The two visions believed in the survival of the group and the need for collective action.
The period of the Brotherhood's rule was consistent with that of the various Salafist currents, despite some errors.
In the year following the downfall of the Muslim Brotherhood, the group found itself in a severe predicament. It was already involved, and some of its leaders became fugitives outside the country and others inside the prisons. The rest became under surveillance, and the fugitives were the worst. Those who escaped Egypt were of treason and hypocrisy. The group adopted the policy of maneuvering, one between the state and the Muslim Brotherhood.
The Islamic Group's strategy was to remain at the forefront of the media scene almost daily. It kept claiming that it was the only group that sacrificed tens of martyrs and the only revolutionary group. It also criticized the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists for their failure.
The group also adopted a new strategy, which became clear by taking the revolutionary title as a weapon, according to escaping leader al-Zomor. It also rallied around the youth of the revolution and to get some limited gains after attempts to withdraw from the Brotherhood.
At the same time, group leaders in other countries acted without calculation. Their randomness increased when the Muslim Brotherhood declared that they would not follow a violent course of action.